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A cyber forensics needs analysis survey: Revisiting the domain’s needs a decade later
Vikram S. Harichandrana , Frank Breitingera,∗, Ibrahim Baggilia , Andrew Marringtonb
a Cyber Forensics Research and Education Group (UNHcFREG)
Tagliatela College of Engineering, University of New Haven, West Haven CT, 06516, United States
b Advanced Cyber Forensics Research Laboratory
Zayed University, United Arab Emirates

Abstract
The number of successful cyber attacks continues to increase, threatening financial and personal security worldwide. Cyber/digital
forensics is undergoing a paradigm shift in which evidence is frequently massive in size, demands live acquisition, and may be
insufficient to convict a criminal residing in another legal jurisdiction. This paper presents the findings of the first broad needs
analysis survey in cyber forensics in nearly a decade, aimed at obtaining an updated consensus of professional attitudes in order to
optimize resource allocation and to prioritize problems and possible solutions more efficiently. Results from the 99 respondents gave
compelling testimony that the following will be necessary in the future: (1) better education/training/certification (opportunities,
standardization, and skill-sets); (2) support for cloud and mobile forensics; (3) backing for and improvement of open-source tools
(4) research on encryption, malware, and trail obfuscation; (5) revised laws (specific, up-to-date, and which protect user privacy); (6)
better communication, especially between/with law enforcement (including establishing new frameworks to mitigate problematic
communication); (7) more personnel and funding.
Keywords: Computer forensics, Cyber forensics, Digital forensics, Mobile forensics, Needs analysis, Open source, Privacy,
Research, Survey, Tools.

1. Introduction
With the rising presence of digital devices, information
repositories, and network traffic, cyber forensics (a.k.a. digital forensics) faces an increasing number of cases having evergrowing complexity (Al Fahdi et al., 2013). The large volume of data and the deficit of time needed for examination
have placed pressure on the development of real-time solutions
such as criminal profiling systems, triage automation, and tools
capable of recovery-processing parallelization. These main
challenges have rippled across the field introducing and building upon obstacles related to cyber forensic resources, education/training/certification (ETC), tools & technology, research,
laws, and subdomains.
Needs analysis is one type of assessment tool used for identifying areas that members of a community view as challenging. Performing them periodically is essential to adjust for fluctuating trends. Some of the benefits of needs assessment include improved resource allocation, better efficiency, informed
decision-making, the generation of a professional consensus,
and increased awareness of unaddressed problems and possible
solutions.
The last general needs analysis survey on cyber forensics was
conducted by Rogers & Seigfried (2004), titled “The future of
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computer forensics: a needs analysis survey.” Since the publication of the original study, only subdomains have been assessed. Our study was performed to obtain an updated consensus of the cyber forensics community’s opinions in order to
more extensively identify and prioritize problems and solutions.
We present the feedback of 99 respondents to our 51-question
survey which, among others, strongly motivates the need for
more funding and personnel; better ETC, tools, and communication; updated laws; and research on cloud and mobile forensics. We further performed a direct comparison to the 2004
survey results.
This paper is divided into 6 major sections. First, we present
a summary of challenges & recent findings in Section 2. In
Section 3 we briefly outline the methodology, followed by a
short survey section. The core of this paper is Section 5, which
includes the results. Next, Section 6 discusses the implications
of the results. Then the limitations are stated. Main findings
and future follow-up can be found in Section 8.
2. Summary of challenges & recent findings
Despite a general public concern for cyber security, the technological response, frameworks, and support are lagging behind the escalating rate of crime. The PricewaterhouseCoopers
(PwC) 2014 Global Economic Crime Survey reported 7% of
U.S. organizations lost $1 million or more due to cybercrime
in 2013, and 19% of U.S. entities lost $50,000 to $1 million.
Global equivalents of these financial ranges of loss were 3%
and 8%, respectively (Mickelberg et al., 2014).
November 18, 2015

Accumulation of financial loss is not the only worry as recently shown with the Sony hack in which a group of hackers calling themselves the Guardians of Peace gained access to
Sony systems and threatened violence on company employees
if the movie ‘The Interview’ was released. Threat of terrorism
caused the banning of the movie in nearly 20,000 theaters in
North America (Dickson, 2015). As mirrored in the PwCs Annual Global CEO Survey of 2014, CEOs and executive boards
must now be concerned with such risks lest denial-of-service attacks and damaged image effect company survival (Mickelberg
et al., 2014). In the foreseeable future, the Internet of Things
(IoT) will likely be just as much of a concern. Automobiles
and other electronically enhanced devices will form new risks
to individuals, businesses, and governments.
Due to such cyber incidents, the area of cyber forensics has
gained ample publicity over the recent years as it becomes more
important to analyze and understand breaches. In the following
subsections we summarize the state of the art cyber forensics
practices and research.1 First, however, the previous general
needs analysis survey is described.

stores in 2014 ($8.6 million per company) was more than double that of 2013 (Walters, 2014). Estimations only account for
publicly disclosed figures. We posit that reported numbers from
surveys are likely to be underestimations because of their voluntary nature. Prevention is clearly not working, which reflects
the accumulation of cases.
Consequently, the question of whether there are enough
forensic practitioners arises, which can only be answered with
speculation as no recent studies have attempted to quantify this;
personnel, as a resource, was evaluated in our survey. General
conjecture is that more cyber forensic scientists and professionals are needed to appease the amount of cases. This is partially
backed by a 37% projected increase in employment of information security analysts (this category encompasses cyber forensics practice) from 2012 to 2022 (Bureau of Labor Statistics,
U.S. Department of Labor, 2014). Funding may need to increase or be reallocated as these jobs are put on the market. Additionally, in part due to the variety of both cases that practitioners deal with and the methods they use to analyze the evidence,
there is still no standardized certification for examiners (Srinivasan, 2013). Instead, professionals usually obtain tool-specific
certifications. The same can be seen in law enforcement and judicial courts. A recent study supported by the National Institute
of Justice (NIJ) indicated that first-responding officers often do
not know how to properly secure digital evidence, and that prosecutors have a tendency to request all information from devices
without considering their physical storage size (Goodison et al.,
2015). Such a diverse and likely insufficient large pool of personnel urges the creation of faster and more efficient tools and
technology to improve case processing.

2.1. Rogers & Seigfried survey
The first and only needs analysis survey conducted by Rogers
& Seigfried (2004) consisted of a single question asking participants to list what they viewed as the top five issues in computer
forensics (computer forensics was more synonymous with cyber forensics then). Responses were tallied into high-order categorizations, exhibiting the following order of frequency (from
most mentioned to least):
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.

Education/training/certification
Technologies
Encryption
Data acquisition
Tools
Legal justice system
Evidence correlation
Theory/research
Funding
Other

2.3. Tools & technology
In the past, tools tended to be technology-oriented, inconveniencing non-technical users, and lacked user-friendly, intuitive
interfaces (Reith et al., 2002). Today, investigating simple questions such as whether two people were in contact and which
websites a person has visited still requires too much time and
effort. Usually, following complex leads result in the case being
handed on to more experienced, specialized investigators. Tool
usability and reporting is an important issue because “misunderstanding that leads to false interpretations may impact reallife cases” (Hibshi et al., 2011). Furthermore, recent work has
illustrated that tools still lack standardized reporting mechanisms, and even though research has been conducted on this
front, the tools have not adopted a standard for digital evidence
items (Bariki et al., 2011). The young, incompletely explored
open-source landscape needs further inquiry as well because
there is powerful functionality to be gained from tools tested,
validated, and constantly updated via communal repositories or
trusted open-sourced centers (Greek, 2013).
Two other approaches being worked on to improve tool efficiency is implementation of automation and real-time processing technology. Triage automation is considered by some to
be essential for dealing with the increasing number of cases
(Garfinkel, 2013). The plethora of photos created every day
illustrates the need for automation. Photo doctoring is becoming commonplace yet automation of image forgery detection

These categories were used in our study to directly assess
how the understanding of challenges changed over the last
decade. Since the time of the preliminary paper, many new
challenges have emerged.
2.2. Resource allocation & education / training / certification
Although a variety of crimes can be committed using digital devices (violent crimes, terrorism, espionage, counterfeiting, drug trafficking, and illicit pornography to name a few) the
largest driving force for cyber forensics is crime related to financial security. A survey conducted by the Ponemon Institute
indicated the average cost of cybercrime for United States retail
1 For

more background reading on the current standards see Darnell (2012).
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is still not possible (Birajdar & Mankar, 2013). Automation
could be critical in the future as instances of slander and false
evidence increase. Indeed, earlier this year a new Stegosploit
tool demonstrated malicious, self-executing code could be hidden within pictures (Harblson, 2015). On the other hand, mobile and flash memory devices (including video game consoles
and eBook readers) have resulted in quick evidence deletion. To
combat this, memory forensics, real-time detection, and parallel
processing research has surfaced. Parallel processing would be
most beneficial in these areas: traffic generation (network models), imaging and carving processes, and development of user
history timelines (Nance et al., 2009). Finally, it is unclear how
to separate user/owner privacy and identification from thorough
investigations, and this seems to be a topic of increasing interest
(Aminnezhad et al., 2012).

2.5. Law
Whatever the progress made in researching better solutions
and improving tools, practitioners are limited by what they can
and cannot do by law, and the evidence they find may not convict a criminal (Hack In The Box Security Conference, 2012;
Dardick, 2010). Ransomware is a prime example of the effective means criminals now possess to anonymously and rapidly
cash out (European Cybercrime Center, 2014). In the case of
cloud forensics, research needs to be conducted to show the
true impact of clouds on cyber forensics before frameworks
and guidelines can be established (Grispos et al., 2013). However, in most cases there is ample evidence showing laws are
outdated. The subdomain of cloud forensics has proven the
need for new laws related to proactive collection of data and
multi-jurisdiction laws (Ruan et al., 2013). A comprehensive
international decree, possibly headed by the United Nations
(U.N.), is imperative. According to Barwick (2014), currently
“data sovereignty laws hamper international crime investigations” and although the U.N. adopted a surveillance proposal
in 2013 more forensic-oriented laws are still deemed necessary.
Of course, in addition to these laws judges themselves must
be educated and trained, since they are responsible for determining what types of digital evidence are allowed in their courts
and how they are used for incrimination. These decisions are
mostly guided by three pieces of legislation: Daubert v. Merrel
Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. (1993), Kumho Tire v. Carmichael
(1999), & FRE Rule 702. A small, yet thorough study (Kessler,
2010) involving a survey and interviews established that judicial education systems are lacking for digital evidence; judges
themselves rated their knowledge of computer forensics as less
than computer and Internet technology.

2.4. Research
Research is an essential component in this period of changing focus but may not be achieving ideal output. Scientific
journals within the field are relatively new, exhibiting “low ISI
impact factors, circulation rates, and acceptance rates” - journals will need time to mature (Beebe, 2009). Experiments are
rarely reproducible because of the lack of corpora, or standardized data sets, made available along with publications, which
could also explain why mainstream journals lack interest in the
domain’s research (Garfinkel et al., 2009). There is a disconnect between practitioners and researchers. Despite their different roles in the field, research should support the desires of
those practicing evidence recovery and examination. A survey
by Al Fahdi et al. (2013) marked that practitioners were concerned with anti-forensics and encryption as future challenges
while researchers worried about tool capability and social networking. Difference in opinion may be caused by the particular
problems these two groups handle, but this disparity should not
be present (ideally) when determining prioritization of research
topics or funding. Whether this is currently the case is unclear.
This disconnect can also be thought of as a failure for research
to affect end users as discussed by Garfinkel (2010).
Baggili et al. (2013) studied cyber forensics research trends
by analyzing 500 papers from the domain and categorizing
them. The overall results indicated that the rate of publication
in cyber forensics continues to increase over time. Additionally,
results showed an overall lack of anti-forensics research where
only 2% of the sampled papers dealt with anti-forensics. The
results also showed that 17% of the samples were secondary research, 36% were exploratory studies, 33% were constructive
and 31% were empirical. One important finding was the discovery of a lack of basic research, where most of the research
(81%) was applied, and only 19% of the articles were categorized as basic research. Also, the results exemplified a shortcoming in the amount of quantitative research in the discipline,
with only 20% of the research papers classified as quantitative,
and the other 80% classified as qualitative. Furthermore, results
showed that the largest portion of the research (almost 43%)
from the examined sample originated from the United States.
In summary, some of the identified challenges, and their associated needs, in cyber forensics research are not fully understood.

2.6. Communication
In response to a survey of Australia’s finance and insurance industry there was a high no-incident and no-response rate
(around 83%) when companies were asked about their most significant computer security incident (Choo, 2011). This suggests
victims may not be aware they have been successfully attacked
or that private companies are reluctant to report victimization.
If the latter is true, a framework for anonymous reporting may
be useful. Also, as mentioned in Section 2.4, differences in
opinion between practitioners, researchers, law enforcement,
and non-forensic entities may occur natively due to their different roles but little to no research has been conducted into
whether this is due to faulty communication.
2.7. Urgency of closing the gaps
The end of the “Golden Age” of cyber forensics, as described
by Garfinkel (2010), has quickly outdated many methods used
by examiners, causing a paradigm shift with unclear direction.
Some of the major concerns include standardization, researching new methods to speed up evidence recovery and analysis
(proactive cyber forensics), support for non-traditional devices,
and bringing about cheaper tools that support a wider variety of
purposes (whether they are all-in-one or bolster a specific function). Although the field is on its way to making some changes,
3

many obstacles such as the ones described in the above subsections prevail. Disregarding the rapidly increasing (successful)
crime rate, the need to determine the direction of research, practice, and laws is vital. Cyber forensics’ growth will continue to
be stunted until these challenges are concretely addressed.

communication, or state their area is underfunded), and to understand how motivated people are to join such areas (e.g. hypothetically, if academia/research was found to be underfunded
less people might find the domain desirable, which would be a
problem if more employees were needed in this domain).

3. Methodology
5. Results

To complete this work, the following high-level methodology
was employed:

The survey was available online for one month before data
were exported from the system. Ninety-nine participants submitted responses. The calculated required sample size was 76
indicating that the number was large enough to make inferences
from and that statistical tests were unlikely to exhibit type II errors (two-sided t-test, alpha = 0.05, using a medium effect size
of 0.5 and power of 0.99). It should be noted that we aspired
to obtain a higher response rate, but taking into account the
relative size of the cyber forensics domain compared to cyber
security in general, we deemed the sample size acceptable.
We would like to point out that although websites (e.g., the
Digital Forensics Training on LinkedIn or the First Forensic Forum2 (F3)) have hundreds or thousands of members, we do not
believe citing the number provides a good estimation of the size
of the domain – people in LinkedIn groups often are there to
observe or self-promote, and may not be active members of the
community. A reasonable approach to analyze the number of
practitioners would be to count all degree holders of organizations that provide certifications. However, organizations as such
do not publicly release statistics on how many professionals are
trained or end up as practitioners in the domain.
This section’s structure reflects that of Section 2, preceded
first by an overview of the demographics and a comparison with
the 2004 survey. Figures and tables related to this section using percentages may not sum exactly to 100% due to rounding
error.

1. Performed a literature review (main findings are mentioned in Section 2) and survey design.
2. Obtained a category two exemption from the Institutional
Review Board (IRB) at the University of New Haven (this
meant that the survey did not record participant identification information or behavior, and posed no risk or harm to
subjects not encountered in every day life).
3. Distributed the survey via list servers, LinkedIn cyber
forensics groups, Twitter, and e-mail contacts.
4. Obtained data by exporting the coded responses to XLSX
and CSV files from the Baseline survey system.
5. Analyzed the data using statistical probability, power tests,
and crossing non-demographic questions with demographics and each other.
4. Survey design
The questions were formulated based on typical needs assessment topics, the Rogers & Seigfried (2004) survey, critical areas from the literature review that were unknown or deserved further investigation, and our interests. The survey went
through three drafts, followed by a brief testing phase, in which
three experts within the field were consulted to refine the wording, content, and formatting of the survey.
Needs assessment is a systematic process for determining
gaps between the status quo and the desires of those within a
community. Consequently, survey questions were designed to
identify unmet desires rather than explicitly obtain statistics on
the current state of the field. The survey consisted of 51 questions:

5.1. Demographics
The results of the demographics questions are presented in
Table 1. It shows that most respondents were American (54%),
25-54 years old, had 11 years or more of experience, and
had most experience in computer (disk) and mobile forensics.
Albeit ages of respondents were evenly spread between age
groups from 25 to 54, the years of experience participants reported were uneven, showing peaks at 2-4 years and 11 years
or more. Just over half of the respondents were practitioners and most belonged to private organizations not related to
the government or law enforcement. Because 28% said they
work within education/training/certification (ETC) and over
50% were practitioners there is a chance some trainers and educators may be practitioners as well.

• 28 Likert scale
• 13 multiple choice
• 7 multiple selection (checkbox)
• 2 free response
• 1 ranking
According to IRB practices at our institution, participants could
not be forced to answer any single question.
A general cyber forensics audience was targeted for the survey because of the researcher-practitioner discrepancies mentioned before (Section 2.4), to obtain as unbiased and wholesome a perspective as possible (for instance, if asked a group
may likely blame another group rather than themselves for poor

2 https://www.f3.org.uk
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(last accessed 2015-08-10).

4.
5.
6.
7.
8.

Percentage
Region of residence
North America
Europe
Middle East
South Asia
East Asia
Australia
Russia

56.7
23.7
7.2
6.2
2.1
2.1
2.1

The data were analyzed via a Friedman test3 , determining that
there is a significant difference among the 9 categories within
a 95% confidence interval. The top two categories (ETC and
Technologies) did not change when compared to the earlier survey. However, encryption moved down 3 places, while evidence correlation and theory/research moved up 3 places; this
may reflect the current interest in producing automated and new
technologies in the field.

Age
18-24
25-34
35-44
45-54
55-64
65 or older

6.3
25.3
24.2
25.3
14.7
4.2
Gender

Female
Male
Years of experience in cyber forensics
0-1 years
2-4 years
5-7 years
8-10 years
11 years or more
Primary occupation
Industry instructor
Law enforcement practitioner
Non-law enforcement practitioner
Professor
Researcher
Student
Occupation category
Education/training facility/university
Federal/national law enforcement
State/local law enforcement
Military/national security
Legal system
Private organization that doesn’t fit into any of the above
Public organization that doesn’t fit into any of the above
Fields of expertise
Crime scene investigation (first responding)
Cloud forensics
Computer (disk) forensics
Database forensics
Memory forensics
Mobile forensics
Multimedia forensics (audio, video, image, etc.)
Network forensics
Software/malware forensics
Non-traditional forensics (game consoles, printers, etc.)

Evidence correlation
Theory/research
Encryption
Legal/justice system
Data acquisition & Funding (tied)

14.9
85.1
11.5
25.0
16.7
11.5
35.4

5.3. Resource allocation
As shown in Figure 1, the types of resources having the
strongest correlation to being insufficient were personnel and
funding. Interestingly, in the Likert scale questions ETC and
funding had similarly strong correlations while the ranked question (Section 5.2) had a clear separation of the two resources
(ETC at top and funding at bottom). This may be due to the
question format.

3.1
20.8
33.3
14.6
16.7
11.5

Lacking resources

28.1
7.3
15.6
1.0
3.1
37.5
7.3

0%

Amount of disk space needed for
recovered evidence
Amount of physical space needed
for recovered evidence
Education/training opportunities
Evidence processing time

11.9
3.5
28.8
1.5
5.4
18.5
5.8
13.5
9.6
1.5

Funding
Personnel
Quality hardware tools

Quality software tools
Strongly Disagree

Table 1: Not all participants answered the demographics questions but the lowest number of respondents for any one question was 94, meaning most did.

Disagree

20%
13

14

12

16

2 6
13

18

17

80%

9

32
29

47

31

35

42

40

38

37

27

Neutral

7

49

38

14

34

Agree

100%

41

34

7
10

60%

23

13

2 8
4

40%

18
29

Strongly Agree

Figure 1: Each bar represents one Likert scale question. Approximate percentages are displayed for each answer selection.

5.2. Comparison to Rogers & Seigfried survey
One of the main purposes of our survey was to determine
how the view of future challenges within cyber forensics had
changed since the Rogers study (Section 2.1). A single question
asked participants to rank the categories that were formed in
the 2004 survey with the results showing the following order
according to calculated average rankings:

Unexpectedly, 78% of those who thought public organizations needed more funding were non-law enforcement practitioners (Figure 2)4 . About half of those who chose federal/national law enforcement were law enforcement practitioners. No bias was observed in the other categories.

1. Education/training/certification (ETC)
2. Technologies
3. Tools

3 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Friedman_test (last accessed
2015-08-10).
4 Chi-squared test, p = 0.005.

5

Domains needing increase in funding
0%

5%

10%

15%

20%

25%

30%

35%

Education/training
facilities/universities
Federal/national law enforcement
State/local law enforcement

Military/national security
Legal system
Private organizations that don't fit into
any of the above
Public organizations that don't fit into
any of the above

Figure 2: This multiple selection checkbox question allowed for respondents to
select up to 2 of the answers shown above.

Thirty-four people responded to the practitioner-oriented free
response question asking to list types of cases personally encountered that need further support/attention. Cloud/database
forensics was mentioned 7 times, mobile forensics 6 times, and
non-traditional devices 6 times (satellite, navigation, CCTV
systems & game consoles; especially development of tools
for these scenarios). Other concerns involved more support
for Linux & Mac systems at law enforcement offices, timeline/profiling tools, and chip-off forensics. The concern for mobile support was echoed in another question asking which operating systems needed more support in respect to cyber forensic cases (about 24% selected each Android and iOS, while all
other systems were below 12%).

The high desire for more ETC opportunities for the education/training facilities/universities category can be interpreted
as a need for more cyber forensics programs at universities and
offered certifications at training facilities. This concern was less
prevalent among Europeans than North Americans; the second
most frequent choice for Europeans was federal/national law
enforcement rather than ETC. Legal system was selected relatively frequently, which was an outstanding observation considering it was among the smallest occupational demographics.
Figure 4 implies practitioners need to know how to use tools,
but this is only complementary to a thorough understanding of
the forensic process/investigative skills. Reverse engineering
also was expressed as a valuable skill for the future, possibly
because the plethora of software being developed is increasing
and may need some level of reverse engineering to help examiners gain access to evidence. This could be explained by reverse
engineering being innately time intensive, thus requiring more
experts to combat recovery time. Or it may be a prerequisite for
mobile forensics when encountering devices that are not supported by mobile acquisition and analysis toolkits given their
proprietary nature.

Skills needed in the future
0% 2% 4% 6% 8% 10% 12% 14% 16% 18% 20%

Algorithm development
Data recovery
Data science (machine learning, data
mining, etc.)
Device exploitation
Investigative skills

5.4. Education/training/certification
As seen in Figure 3, the majority of respondents clearly
thought state/local law enforcement needs more ETC opportunities. This was mirrored in the practitioner free response where
a few respondents mentioned law enforcement & three letter
agencies need more education on basics like Domain Name
System (DNS) and working with Internet Service Providers
(ISPs) or hosting companies.

Network traffic analysis
Proficient use of forensics tools
Programming (scripting and tool
building)
Report writing
Reverse engineering
Other

Domains needing increase in ETC
opportunities
0%

5%

10%

15%

20%

25%

30%

Education/training
facilities/universities

Figure 4: This multiple selection checkbox question allowed for respondents to
select up to 3 of the answers shown above.

5.5. Tools & technology
The Likert scale questions in Figure 5 clearly show that opensource tools are not meeting the desires of professionals. They
need to be both better and funded adequately. Most participants
also indicated that commercial tools should be cheaper.
The checkbox question in Figure 6 shows that mobile and
cloud forensic tools and technology need improvement most.
North Americans were most concerned with mobile forensics
while Europeans were most concerned with cloud forensics.
This could be construed as a result of these domains being
newer and currently experiencing rapid growth. Alternatively,
it could be that in Europe there is a larger concern with cloud

Federal/national law enforcement
State/local law enforcement
Military/national security
Legal system
Private organizations that don't fit
into any of the above
Public organizations that don't fit into
any of the above

Figure 3: This multiple selection checkbox question allowed for respondents to
select up to 2 of the answers shown above.
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forensics given their typically more stringent privacy concerns
when compared to the United States.

Tools
0%

Tools need to cost less

Tool user interfaces need to be
more standardized
Reports developed by tools need
more standardization
Format/file types need more
standardization
Capabilities of tools are too niche
oriente
Open-source tools need
improvement
Open-source tools need more
funding
Strongly Disagree

20%

14

40%

27

1

3 7

12

Disagree

15

41

23

10

4

32

24

19

47

23

30

17

19
27

41

16

5.6. Research

11

The Likert scale questions about research (Figure 7) indicated a strong need to research encryption, malware, and trail
obfuscation countermeasures. Criminal profiling systems, data
wiping, and evidence displayed opinions closer to a neutral
standpoint.

37

33

Neutral

100%

31

33

11

80%

37

19

4

60%

47

Agree

new field. Although a definition was only published in 2014
(Breitinger et al., 2014), the first algorithm ssdeep came out
eight years earlier (Kornblum, 2006). Only 13% of respondents
use these algorithms on a regular basis while 34% only had
used them a few times before. Thirty-one percent said they had
not used them because they were not necessary for their purposes, 7% reported they are too slow for practical use, and 15%
did not know what similarity hashing was. Europe is ahead in
adopting this technology (68% of Europeans had used it before
compared to only 40% of North Americans).5

Strongly Agree

Future challeneges needing research

Figure 5: Each bar represents one Likert scale question. Approximate percentages are displayed for each answer selection.

0%

Tools/technology needing improvement
0%

5%

10%

15%

20%

2 5

27

Attacks against digital forensics tools

3 4

28

25%

Crime scene investigation (first
responding)

Automatic triage systems
Criminal profiling systems

Cloud forensics

Data wiping

Computer (disk) forensics

Encryption

Database forensics

Evidence modeling

Memory forensics
Mobile forensics
Multimedia forensics (audio, video,
image, etc.)
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Figure 7: Each bar represents one Likert scale question. Approximate percentages are displayed for each answer selection.
Figure 6: This multiple selection checkbox question allowed for respondents to
select up to 3 of the answers shown above.

A free response research-oriented question investigated what
topics participants thought will be most important to research in
the next 5-10 years. The 35 answers most frequently mentioned
cloud forensics (10 times) and mobile forensics (6 times). Other
common mentions were malware, encryption, solid state drives,
and network forensics (the prior two concerns reflected in the
Likert scale questions). A few respondents also expressed
worry for the future of the Internet of Things/embedded devices.

Two multiple choice questions were used to assess the use of
hashing algorithms which are commonly used in digital forensics. About 42% of respondents claimed they use MD5 the most
(another 40% split evenly between SHA1 and SHA-256). We
noticed that older respondents were more likely to use MD5
the most. Despite being considered flawed, practitioners most
likely use it because it is fast, short, and the only option in some
software. However, this phenomenon could also be due to being
unaware of its flaws, or not regarding MD5’s flaws significant
enough for their purposes or being not aware of newer developments.
To proof our statement that many people are not aware
of/avoid new technologies, we asked about approximate matching, a.k.a. similarity hashing or fuzzy hashing, which is a rather

5.7. Laws
There was an overwhelming consensus that laws pertaining
to cyber forensics are out of date, as shown in Figure 8. The
5 Chi-squared

7

test, p = 0.025.

reasonably substantial evidence that user privacy needs to be
protected more, along with these opinions, implies a strong
need for overhaul since most of the respondents were practitioners and likely deal with legal issues more directly than
non-practitioners. As mentioned in Section 2.5, laws have seen
sparse attention.

Law
0%

Laws need to be more specific

5

Laws need to be more up to date

13

User privacy needs to be protected
more

4

Strongly Disagree

Disagree

20%
9

40%

24

8

60%

80%

43
45

100%
19

5.9. Domain categorization
Two general questions were asked about the definition of cyber forensics. The first asked if the participants considered the
field a (formal) science to which there was a resounding “yes”
(77%). The second question asked whether cyber forensics is
an engineering discipline. North Americans were undecided
but European input tipped the scale toward an overall 63% affirmation.

43

17

26

32

Neutral

Agree

Three yes or no questions asked respondents about communication with ISPs (e.g. AT&T, Verizon, and Comcast), online
service providers (e.g. Google, Yahoo, Facebook), and computer and mobile manufacturers. In all three of these questions
a unanimous call for new established frameworks for communicating with these organizations was observed (over 78% for
each). Once again, the relative size of the private organization
demographic and the polarized opinions of these questions may
mean such frameworks are nonexistent or extremely weak.

21

Strongly Agree

Figure 8: Each bar represents one Likert scale question. Approximate percentages are displayed for each answer selection.

5.8. Communication

6. Discussion

The matrix in Figure 9 explicitly indicates that state/local
law enforcement needs to communicate more effectively (13
occurrences where it was paired with federal/national law enforcement and 12 occurrences where it was paired with legal
system). Overall federal/national law enforcement was chosen
most for poor communication. Since ETC was also selected frequently, better/increased communication between practitioners
and educators/researchers will need to occur.

The results of the survey signed several things about cyber
forensics. As in most technical domains, there is a relatively
low number of females in the demographics; possibly the field
is still unevenly gender balanced. A second eye-catching aspect
was that no respondents were from Africa. This might have to
do with the distribution method. Taking a closer look at the
fields of expertise shows that only a few respondents had expertise in database forensics and only slightly more had cloud
forensics expertise. These were top concerns for the future and
although they are newer subdomains more experts must arise
quickly if the field is to keep stride with criminals. Certainly,
mobile forensics is extremely important as all types of cases
involve mobile evidence (Saleem et al., 2014).
The upset with funding in the results can be rationalized by
a low federal demographic; federal labs are more likely to “report analyzing digital evidence,” implying that non-federal facilities are not equipped well enough to deal with cybercrime
(Durose et al., 2012). Such lack of cohesion within the field is
now leading to the call for an official governing body (Waziri &
Sitarz, 2015), something that may also require a federal and
non-federal delegation; a distinct difference in concerns between demographics was solidified in a 2009 survey addressing
top priorities: law enforcement selected best practice issues as
most critical, government selected jurisdictional issues, commercial selected access & exchange of information (Liles et al.,
2009).
Since the legal system was ranked a relatively low priority in
the Rogers & Seigfried followup question one would assume it
is not a top priority within the field. However, the Likert scale
questions advocated major amendment. Since the legal system demographic was close to non-existent we think a followup study would be beneficial — one that targets the judiciary
viewpoint. This would be helpful to pinpoint how laws are
not specific enough or could be improved upon to protect users
and effectively prosecute international criminals. A similar issue could be seen in federal/national law enforcement having
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Figure 9: The matrix represents groups that need to communicate more effectively with each other (participants were asked to select a pair). The sizes
of the circles are proportional to their numbers. The total in the bottom row
demonstrates how much each group needs to improve on its communication,
regardless of who they are communicating with. 1 = Education/training facilities/universities, 2 = Federal/national law enforcement, 3 = State/local law
enforcement, 4 = Military/national security, 5 = Legal system, 6 = Other private
organizations, 7 = Other public organizations.
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the poorest communication of any occupational category demographic; it was the smallest. Perhaps a follow-up study might
target federal opinions on the matter.
Many of the results supported recent findings: tools need to
be better (quality, usability, & price) and standardization needs
to increase across the board (laws, tools, education, & communication); all of these were repeatedly found in research presented in Section 2.

forcement and service providers/ISPs warrants the establishment of new correspondence systems. Setting this up will
demand a stepwise coordinated implementation since federal/national law enforcement has problematic communication efforts at the moment (in the eyes of practitioners) and
state/local law enforcement needs more funding.
Other significant results were that research has moved up in
priority in the last decade (malware, encryption, and trail obfuscation now viewed as essential areas of focus) and that the
domain lacks personnel. A recent survey supports this, writing that forensic departments do not have enough personnel to
process the high number of cases, no matter what tools are used
(Goodison et al., 2015). This study also strongly (the likelihood
of incorporation was measured directly) supports the aforementioned need for ETC reform, recommending digital evidence
training be incorporated into both law enforcement and judicial
system curricula.
Followup Delphi-method-based studies and surveys would
be extremely beneficial to target more narrow and well-defined
solutions (such as those mentioned in the Discussion section).

7. Limitations
The Likert scale questions may have exhibited acquiescence
bias (agreement with the statements as presented), because
many questions observed affirmation. However, the questions
were worded in a way to avoid this and this may have simply been a result of grouping questions by topic. Bias by geographic region and other demographics was not observed other
than where mentioned; low count of some demographics prevented drawing further conclusions.
8. Conclusions & follow-up
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